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Struggles and Possibilities:
The Use of Tests in Decision
Making

Ellis Batten Page
Duke University

What a happy occasion it is to celebrate, as we do in this volume , the establishment of a national Buros Institute of Mental Measurements, located on the
campus of the University of Nebraska, in Lincoln . What a culmination of many
plans, hopes, and dreams! On such an occasion, we can take a quiet pride in our
profession and in the life and accomplishments of one of our colleagues and
friends, Oscar Krisen Buros, who with Luella Buros is leaving to us, and our
posterity , an institution of integrity to foster the science and practice of testing.
How new all this field really is: According to Stanley and Hopkins (1972, p.
163), the first large-scale testing was done in the City of New York Survey, in
1911 . Oscar Buros was 6 years old then , so we can think of most of the
astonishing developments in measurement really happening during his lifetime.
And the first machine for scoring of answer sheets, the old IBM 805, was
developed when Oscar was 30. Many of us can remember, only 20 years ago,
many clerical workers reading the dials from these machines and writing the
scores as they might be estimated from this analog device. Then these tools also
became obsolete as the field was overtaken by optical readers and computer
scoring. So Oscar and Luella Buros have witnessed the explosion of testing into a
central institution of education, of psychology, of all the social and behavioral
sciences. But they have done much more than witness: Their publications have
served as a steady center of this growth, and their independence has established a
tradition of reputation and honor as a goal, if not always as a realization , of the
profession and the practice of testing .
The establishment of such published symposia from the Buros Institute is an
important further step. There is a major place for such a forum. I hope these
symposia will represent a determined effort to stand apart from the testing giants,
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just as Buros did, and to remain independent of federal agencies as well. The
Institute, and these symposia , should continue to sponsor solid , sometimes severe criticism of tests and test practices, also as Buros did. They should similarly
stand apart from the political huckstering and trend riding, the cheap shots
against testing, and apart from the constant distortion of what tests tell us about
ourselves and our world.
Of course, the Institute should make full modern use of wordprocess ing,
automatic mailing, information retrieval, and all the present and future efficiencies of operation becoming available. But hopefully there will remain these
steady principles that marked Buros' work, and a simil ar vision of mental measurement , of how it can help our society to be happier and more productive.
At such a historic time, it is a pleasure to remember the classic words of E. L.
Thorndike (1918 , p. 16) , which serve as a kind of cornerstone for our whole
professional and scientific deve lopment:
Whatever ex ists at all ex ists in some amount. To know it thoroughly involves
knowing its qu antity as we ll as its quality. Education is concerned with chan ges in
human beings; a change is a difference between two conditions; eac h of these
conditions is known to us only by the products produced by it- things made, words
spoken, acts performed, and the like. To measure any of these products means to
define its amount in some way so that competent persons will know how large it is,
better than they would without measurement. To measure a product well means so
to define its amount that competent persons will know how large it is with so me
precision , and this knowledge will be conveniently recorded and used.

If we have, for our profess ion, an Apostle's Creed, surely Thorndike has here
given it to us. And the last phrase echoes for us: "so that this knowledge will be
conveniently recorded and used." And used. Aye, there's the rub and the thrust
of the testing movement. It is the use of testing that has caused its growth from
academic curiosity to a billion-dollar industry and that makes it a battle ground
today for conflictiong ideologies and the warring of powerful political alliances.
In my opinion, technical people in testing cannot go on sidestepping these major
battl es. Sooner or later, we should recognize publicly what it is that we believe;
we should state our beliefs openly for both colleagues and society; and we should
counterattack the falsehoods about testing.
Who are these enemies? For one example, let us mention the recent storm of
anti testing sentiment surrounding the publication of Gould's (19 8 1) book , The
Mismeasure of Man. This book follows in the tradition of Leon Kamin's (1973)
The Science and Politics of I. Q., the writing of the consumerists Nader and Nairn
and of Lewontin , Layzer, and others. Once again, the major media have rushed
to approve the new book by Gould and to endorse its claims. A recent New
Yorker has an extended piece by one of their science popularizers, in which most
test experts are implicitly denigrated and the founders of our disc ipline are
derided and smeared . There are many echoes of these sentiments.
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The major medi a of the Northeastern Seaboard are, of course, considerably
more antitesting than is the American mainstream. What of the more conservative press? Although it is part of the conservative tradition to recognize and to
accommodate large indi vidu al di ffe rences , the better-known conservative writers
seem daunted by the name-calling and by the technical difficulty of the arg uments. Both sides are handicapped by the recondite nature of many of the core
proofs of testing. As Garrett Hardin recently commented during a visit at Duke,
most opin ion leaders and shapers who control our media, of whatever leaning,
are highly literate but are " innumerate." Left or ri ght, journalists fail to gras p
our technicalities . They believe that our hard-won principles (the best body of
theory in the social sc iences) are purely a matter of opinion!
Then what about the " numerate" scienti sts concerned with tests? Those who
do speak out often suffer for it and are frustrated again and again by the major
media. Consider, the experiences of one of our most productive and di stinguished
defenders of psychometri cs, Arthur R . Jensen of Berkeley. Those who know him
well can recount some of hi s harassment and defamation , which , by the way, is
still going on. And Richard Herrnstein (1982) of Harvard has written a critique,
much of it fro m his own unhappy treatment , about his efforts to be expressed
properl y in the major media. His forum is the Atlantic Monthly, an intellectual
magazine that is highly respected and of general readership but that commands
none of the publicity clout of CBS or of the Ne w Yo rk Times and their multimillion audiences . Some of Herrnstein ' s ( 1982) accusation is worth reproducing
here:
Incurabl y addi cted to qu antificati on, I have now searched the daily and the Sunday
New York Tim es from 1975 to Nove mber 198 1 for all book reviews dea ling with the
IQ. T he res ults speak for themselves. Of the 15 reviews that I fo und, everyone'
deni grated IQ tests, often vitriolicall y. All but two of the books reviewed were ant itesting, as far as one can te ll fro m the reviews, and were praised for their position .
One exception was a boo k by Arthur Jensen lI 980] , which happened also to be the
onl y book by a trained psyc hometrician (psychometri cs is the psychological specialty concerned with testing). Jensen 's book was panned by a philosopher with no
detectable ex pertise in the subj ect.
Except for Jensen's book, none of the other major works on testing written by
pro fess ionals during the period was reviewed. Most remarkabl y, however, the
Times published no rev iew by a trained profess ional. Dozens of literate psyc hometri cians mi ght have commented on the shallowness of the books the Times
usuall y chooses to re~"iew . But psychometrics is forbidden territory in the Timesits books are mos tly unreviewed , its discoveries are unreported, and its experts are ,
from what gets published , unconsulted. Rarely, if ever, in more th an a decade , has
a spec ialist published a review of a book on testing in the Times, [or in] other
national publicati ons that occasionall y co mment on testing. For no other subj ect of
public concern- not for economi c policy, disarmament, we lfare reform, nuclear
power plants- has the professional outl oo k on a controversy been so shut off fro m
a voice in the nati onal press. Yet , while public policy on testing may not have the
immedi acy of a tax cut or a nuclear accident , it ul timate ly affects everyone lp . 69] .
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A DOUBLE STANDARD
Herrnstein's (1982) article is a good one, revealing for all concerned with testing
and education. Its principal burden is the double standard of treatment of two
cases of apparent malfeasance by testing researchers: One of these cases is
known widely even to college students; the other is a nonevent, conveniently
buried from public awareness . The first, so widely known, concerns the probable
falsification of certain twin data by the late, brilliant Sir Cyri l Burt. Herrnstein
counted at least six stories about this apparent misconduct in the New York Times
alone. However, as repeatedly noted by scholars of behavior genetics, nothing in
Burt's estimates was very deviant from what has been found by other researchers
since his reports. Burt's data are, in short, now redundant, and if he did fabricate
some of his numbers, he "apparently knew enough to guess correctly" (Herrnstein, 1982, p. 70). But the attacks on him persist, endlessly, and are made
central to denigrating not only behavior genetics but our entire field of mental
measurement.
The other story will probably be new to many readers and will surely be new
to most nonspecialists. In J ul y 1981, Dr. Rick Heber, Director of the Waisman
Center of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and chief adviser to a U.S.
president on mental retardation, was convicted in federal court of diverting funds
to personal use and was sentenced to 3 years in prison. Heber, it will be remembered, was principal investigator of the much publicized miracle of the environmentalist movement, the "Milwaukee Project." He had proved, he wrote, that it
was possible to take 20 children of retarded parents and depressed homes and to
raise their true IQs an average of over 30 points, from dull normal to superior in
intelligence, by a massive preschool intervention.
What of his results themselves and their claim to scientific seriousness? Eight
years before that trial , an article was published for fellow researchers (Page,
1972b), arguing that the Milwaukee Project was, for a number of technical
reasons, not scientifically credible. And just before Heber's indictment, another
article (Page & Grandon, 1981) carried an intensive criticism of the Project. In
brief, we found that the Project, which had never been truly refereed , was
extremely shaky, and the 'explanations of it shifted in ways quite unacceptable in
scientific reporting . What evidence was avai lable on follow-up data, moreover ,
suggested that there was no residual difference between the treatment and control
groups on measures , such as school reading tests, which were outside the reach
of Project management. The 30 points gain, if it ever existed, had apparently
disappeared.
The point here, however, is not to resurrect the Milwaukee Miracle to slay it
again but to draw attention to the way that psychometric questions are treated in
the media. The earlier "findings" of the Milwaukee Project had been widely
noted in the national media. The Washington Post believed that it might have
"settled once and for all" (sic) the question of heredity versus environment for
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the intelligence of slum children. The New York Times had reported that the
Project "has proved" that IQs could be raised more than 30 points by the
methods of Heber and his associates (these quotes cited by Herrnstein , 1982).
Wouldn't one suppose, therefore, that the disgrace of the Project leadership
deserved some attention? After all, the Milwaukee work had been unique and
widely acclaimed in its demonstration of such large environmental effects. And
this demonstration had depended on faith in its leadership. Wouldn't the astonishing misconduct of the leadership , then , cast some shadow across such
findings, which no one else had obtained?
Not at all. Not a word about the Heber scandal has appeared in the Times, the
newsweeklies , Science magazine, or on national TV. To quote Herrnstein (1982)
again,
The media seem unwilling to publish anything that might challenge the certitude
with whi ch editors, politicians, judges, and others insist that we know how to
increase meas urable intelligence, or that test data "prove," to use The New York
Times's word , that a poor environment causes fa milial retardation [p o 7 10) .

What is the cause of this remarkable double standard? Clearly , it is the ideology
of the major media, warmly supportive even of falsehoods favora ble to environmentali sm, generally condemnatory of individual differences and hence of psychometrics, our field , which persistently and embarrassingly reiterates important
and substantial differences in humankind .
Yes, we have our critics, and they have an extraordinary double standard; and
they are in very strong positions, affecting the beliefs of everyone: of editors,
educators, judges, legislators, federal officers, and the other countless millions
who read the national press or listen to the national TV. If we believe in our
di scipline and its contributions to society , then we had better stand up for ourselves and our field. What, then, do we believe?

THE VALUE OF TESTING
Scientific Value. In our own quiet way, and in .our own private literature,
there is a strong consensus among us concerning the pers isting values of our
science and our profession. In an excellent summary of this question , the scientific basis of testing was powerfully defended by Carroll and Horn (1981) . They
showed our growth to be following the earlier development of physics, in our
gathering understanding of intelligence and our strengthening theory.
Poor Alternatives to Testing . Many of our negative reactions to our critics
and would-be reformers are similarly shared among ourselves . That the interference of the courts is often ignorant , confused, and damaging is noted by even
the mildest of sc ientific commenters (Bersoff, 1981) . And the reforms forced on
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testing by outside criticism have, we are largely agreed , been frequently " nonsolutions" (Reschly , 1981). Such " unproductive changes" include the banning
of intelligence tests (such as in California) and the use of " pluralistic norms"
(such as SOMPA; cf. Mercer, 1977) . Often aggressive counterattacks to our
critics are slipped quietly into our thoughtful articles written for each other. Such
a counterattack is well illustrated by the comment of two of our respected
colleagues (Carroll & Horn , 198 1): " Indeed , it seems clear to the present authors
that far from being abused by overuse, the science of human abilities is underexploited in diagnosis, counseling, and evaluation [p o 10 19] ."

Fairness to Minorities. For a very important topic, the claim of racial unfairness , the view of experts was well summarized by Cole (1 98 1) , when she
wrote - that " we have learned that there is not large-scale, consistent bias against
minority groups in the technical validity sense in the major, widely used and
widely studied tests [p o 1075]." This position has been strongly supported by a
blue-ribbon panel on testing of the National Academy of Sciences . And a simil ar
conclusion is widely understood for the question of bi as in college admissions
(Linn , 1982). Indeed , much of the claimed evidence against test validity , for
example in employment , has apparently been misunderstood and improperl y
summarized (especially see Schmidt & Hunter , 198 1).

IDEOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES
Through many arguments about test practice, however, run deeper currents of
contemporary ideology, philosophical , political, and economic . Those who
claim an exclu sively societal or economic determini sm are especially resentful of
testing and psychometric research, and what these disciplines show us about the
sources of human abilities and personality. In a candid account of the contemporary scene, then, we must not avoid the issue of what science and scientists say
about fa mily influences on these traits, both genetic and environmental.

Heritability of Intelligence
Surely we can now say that there is a scientific consensus for the heritability of
intelligence, and we can reject the name-calling of those who would say that
hereditary influence is a delusion or a hoax. If there is any scholar who honestly
questions it , and sincerely seeks evidence, there is a direct solution: Such a
person should read--or even just browse- in Fuller and Thompson 's (1 978)
weighty volume, Foundations of Behavior Genetics . Absorb the stately march
there from fundamental genetic principles to physiology, to neurobiology, to
quantitative methods, to the genetics of cognitive and intellectual abilities, to
personality and temperament , to mental illness. Loiter, for a while, in the 40
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pages of bibliography with their 1500 references. And for those with quantitative
curiosity , there are excellent works available (Falconer , 1960; Thompson &
Thoday, (979) .
Or, if a scholar seeks further knowledge of the genetic evidence specific to
mental measurements, give such a scholar Jensen's (1980) monumental book
Bias in Mental Testing . Someday this may be more widely recognized as one of
the best works ever written on testing , for the serious student of psychometrics .
(For other informed appraisals of such evidences, see Bereiter, 1970; Cancro ,
1971 ; Hebert , 1977. And for a nontechnical treatment of the issues, see Jensen,
198 1.) But then, how should we convince the lay world outside of the large
consensus on this matter of heritability? In 1972 , more than 50 scholars from
fields bearing on this question published a " Resolution on Scienti fic Freedom
and Heredity ," signing the emphatic statement that " we believe such influences
are very strong. " (Page, 1972c). Of the 50 signers, 60% were in Who' s Who in
America, and four were Nobel laureates. And their statement was publi shed in
the most prominent professional journal in psychology. But that testament , too ,
became a nonevent fo r the major media to ignore . The national press took no
notice of this, nor did C BS when its special, " The IQ Myth ," led by Dan
Rather, managed , thro ugh dist0l1ion and omission, to make test scores seem a
pure artifact of favored environments. One of the most common responses of
in formed psychologists and measurement experts is to avoid these questions or ,
if pressed , to state that these questions are not important for our major concern :
the use of tests in decision making. On the contrary, I hope to persuade that such
evas ions, of such overpoweringly central questions, must lead to waste, futility ,
and di shonor in our testing fi eld . Indeed , to some extent this has already
happened .
Nonetheless , it is curious how blind the media are to this consensus among
scientists about the heritability of intelligence . Even Gould 's (198 1) book , with
its strong ideological loading, does not exactly dispute the exi stence of heritability , though taking exception to nearl y every estimate of it. The device used
by Gould , and by others before him , is to challenge the precision of such an
estimate, as if some softness of numbers invalidated the whole pursuit. If a test
score is not precise, they seem to affirm , it is useless. If a heritability estimate is
not certain , then it is meaningless. One can only imagine the stultifying influence
such perfectionism would have had on the growth of any of our sc iences? But the
clear fac t, revealed even in the most polemical criti cism to the careful reader, is
that there is consensus about the large heritability of general intelligence .

Heritability of Specia l Abilities
Even among able psychometricians, however, there is much uncertainty about
the heritability of specific abilities or ac hievement measures . To explore this
question, a friend and I (Page & J arjoura, 1979) obtained an unprecedented data
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set from one of the two major college testing programs, the respected American
College Testing Program (ACT). Our results are briefly outlined here, as bearing
on this important and neglected problem affecting many of the tests the schools
have so widely adopted. If these measures, too, are loaded with heritability, we
should take this fact carefully into consideration.
As is well known , the ACT has four achievement tests , in the four fields of
English, Math, Social Studies, and Natural Sciences. From two different years of
testing, 1976 and 1978, ACT gathered for us 6800 pairs of twins from the nearly
2 million students who used this excellent program to apply to colleges in those
years . These twins were identified from the concordance of surname, birth date ,
and place of residence (or home phone) . Even without knowing which pairs are
fraternal or identical, it is possible to do some genetic analysis of such a wonderfully large data base, as long as we are willing to make certain assumptions about
same-sexed and opposite-sexed pairs (Scarr-Salapatek, 1971). Here there is little
space for technical detail, but let us consider certain findings, displayed in Table
2.1.
Table 2.1 shows results from a factor analysis of the genetic components
estimated from our methods (Page & Jarjoura, 1979 , p. 11 5). First, we observe
the sizable loadings of the four tests on the principal genetic factor. The
heritability estimates of these four tests were all high , by the way , ranging
from .64 to .84 . That is , each of the four ACT achievement measures showed a
substantial heritability in itself. The further question we raised, however, was the
extent to which the measures were genetically unique and the extent to which
they shared their genetic loadings with the others.
In Table 2.1, Part A shows these loadings of the four measures on the first ,
unrotated principal factor from the genetic correlations we generated . In Part B
of the table, we observe the amount of each of the genetic correlations , which is
explained by the principal component. And in Part C we see that there is also a
genetic loading specific to each of the four tests (these loadings are in the major
diagonal). What is thought provoking, and not often recognized among psychometricians, is that so much of the intercorrelation among such ability and
achievement measures should have a unitary factor as its biological source. And
it appears that G (genetic loading) and g (the always observed correlation among
diverse mental measures) do indeed have much to do with each other. (See also
kinship studies in Behrman, Hrubec , Taubman, & Wales, 1980; Loehlin,
Lindzey, & Spuhler, 1975; Loehlin & Nichols , 1976; Martin, 1975.)
From this example, we can score some points against frequent criticisms . One
of the repeated claims is that Burt's apparent defection destroyed the basis for
any belief in heritability. But obviously, Burt's few disputed twin pairs played no
role in this large analysis (nor in numerous other analyses in the United States or
abroad) . Another strawman from our critics is that we regard intelligence as a
"single thing." This claim is clearly false. Here one sees that, even genetically ,
there are other influences distinct to each trait. Even so, however, here as in all
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TABLE 2.1
Principal Factor Analysi s of th e Gen etic Compon ents of Twin Data"
Trait

English

Engli sh
Math
Soc. St.
Nat. Sc i.

M ath

Soc. St.

Na t. Sci.

(A) Loadings on principal genet ic factor
.7 1
.65
.83
(B) Component "expl ained " by principa l factor
.~
.%
.~
.43
.54
.69

.84

.59
.55
.70
.7 1

(C) Residual component
Engli sh
Math
Soc. St.
Nat. Sc i.

.02

. 14

.2 1

- .02
.00

.00
- .02

. 15

.01
.01

"From Page & Jarjoura, 1979, p. 11 5.
"Of the total geneti c matri x, 8 1.5% of the variance was expl ained by the single factor.

matrices of mental measures we see the ubiquitous positive component underl ying the whole matrix , which in this analysis is genetic. "S ingle thing" it is not;
indeed , by all estimates, it is based on many gene loci. And psycholog ically
there are surely various subabilities that contribute to it. Still , whatever its
nature, g does appear , to a greater or lesser extent , in virtually all mental tests.
Still another charge hurled at testers, but denied by our analysis, is that we
believe that "genetics is all ." Our Table 2. 1 clearly rejects any such conclusion ,
as does the research of everyone else known to us. Indeed , it is the power of
behavior genetics that it can best expose those influences that are, indeed , environmental. For example, we may consider the simple declaration that variance
of a test is the sum of the genetic variance, the enviro nmental vari ance, and error:
Var(test) = Var(G)

+

Var(E)

+

error.

(I)

Then it is possible to regard a test score in the way suggested by Fig . 2. 1.
For students of testing, thi s figure seems a most fa miliar one. From any test,
we might in fe r that the shaded curve represents the vari ance expectable from
error around some true score X'. But let us alter the meaning: Let X' now
represent the genotype, and the shaded figure represent the vari ation expected in
the phenotype, through the operation of a combination of environment and errors
of measurement. What such a perspective makes us realize is that, in each one of
our mental test scores, we are indeed looking at a genotype, plus other influences. That is, we may consider the indi vidual score to consist of genotype
" true" score, the envi ro nmental variations around such a genotype, and of
course a res idual error variance . Indeed , given the enormous amount of research
on these matters, we may assert that, for the individual student , most of the
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FIG . 2. 1 . Fam ili ar figure in measurement , applied to either re li ability o r
heritab ility. X may re present the " true score of a test" and the shaded curve
represent measurement error. O r it may re present the genotype of a tes t for an
indi vidual and the shaded po rtion may represent the co mbination of environmental
influences and meas urement error.

di stance from the mean is difference in genotype , and thi s is true, whether or not
it conforms with the sentiments of CBS or of the New York Times. But this
assertion in no way denies our pursuit of these env ironmental causes of test
performance. Rather , it clarifi es our goal and gives us some methods for identifying the environmental variance without the usual distortion and confounding
with an unconsidered background genetic variation.
The formula in Equation (I) is of course very general. A more detailed
formu la would be the following:
Var(IQ) = Var(E)

+ Var(G) + Cov(G, E) + Var(G

X

E)

+ error ,
(2)

where the two new terms represent the covariance and interaction of the genetic
and environmental influences . These are surely plausible enough additions to
such studies. It is logical that , given the sorting out of soc ial classes, in part
caused by differences in ability of the parents, there cou ld be a correlation of
genes and environment. And it is also logical that , to some extent , what favors
one genotype might not favor another to the same degree.
But such components are difficult to di stinguish in twin data and , therefore,
are usually neglected in studies of heritability because of mathematical confoundin g. Yet critics have sometimes used thi s confounding to disparage any
attempts at heritability analysis. One of the critics is an astronomer, who contemptuou sly referred to the usual methods of human genetics as " numerology ,"
but then himself committed two astonishing logical errors in his mathematical
proof (Layzer, 1974). Each of his objections to heritability leads to reductio ad
absurdum . His policy argument is that all heritability analysis should be curtailed
and that we as a society should emphasize only environmental efforts. Hi s prime
example of such remed iation was the Milwaukee Project (this was, of course,
before those investigations were closed and the leaders sent to Federal prison) .
There were the following two dilemmas : First, GE covariance either ex ists or it
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does not. If it does not ex ist, then heritability analysis may proceed without it. If
it does ex ist, then Layzer is already granting the argument of Herrnstein (1973)
and of others that the upper soc ial cl asses are already partially sorted for genetic
ability in intelligence. Either way , Layzer's practical conclusions are spoiled.
Hi s argument about G x E interaction suffers the same fate. If such interaction
does not ex ist, then heritability studies may proceed without it. If it does exi st,
then , by the very definition of interaction , any marginal improvement in social
environment will be, to the extent of that interaction , as unfavorable as it is
fa vorable. (For a more complete treatment of thi s question , see Page, 1975; and
for general treatment of interaction effects in the context of intelligence, see
Eaves, Last, Maltin , & Jinks, 1977 .)
Again , why are such matters worth speaking about , in a volume devoted to
tests and decision making? Is it not enough that most able testers acknowledge
the truth of heritability and of innate individual differences? Isn ' t thi s fac t,
indeed , something of an embarrassment to testing? Shouldn ' t we continue, by
our pass ive, noncommittal reaction to these controversies, to paper it over? Isn' t
it , in fact, almost bad manners to raise the question ? So it has often been treated ,
and there is usually , as Herrnstein (1 973 ) points out , a personal and professional
cost in res isting the tide of opinion as shaped by the major medi a.
But these questions are important exactly because our fa ilure to resist such
untruths is damaging the reputation of testing and seriously undermining its
utility in making decisions. The truth or falsity of our assumptions is crucial to
making long-range decisions, by the very nature of scientific dec ision making.
To support this assertion , we turn to the nature of decision making and to the
kinds of information requi red to make an intelligent choice.

DECISION MAKING
We should recognize that a sc ience of dec ision making has become itself a vast
and we ll -deve loped field of applied mathematics and stati stics with many
branches: linear programming, dynamic programming, transportation algorithms, queue ing theory, and many other techniques with large implications
fo r behavior science . For a survey of the general fi eld , the reader may see many
general texts in operation s research (Churchman, Ackoff, & Arnoff, 1957 ; Hillier & Lieberman , 1974; Trueman , 1974; Wagner, 1969) and increasingly in
statistics (Hamburg, 1970; Winkler & Hays, 1975). Some of these methods have
been studied for psychology or education (Anderson, 1970; Banghart, 1969;
Johnstone, 1974; Kaufman , 1972; Levin , 1975; McNamara, 197 1; Novick &
Jackson , 1974; Page, 1976 , 1978; Page & Canfield , 1975; Page, Jarjoura, &
Konopka, 1976 ; Tillett , 1975; VanDu sseldorp , Rich ardson, & Foley, 1971) . A
few have brought such methods to bear directly on the use of tests (Cronbach &
GIeser, 1965; Edwards, Guttentag, & Snapper, 1975; Page, 1980) . In general,
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however, there has been little recognition of its importance to educational psychology and its kindred disciplines, and few investigators have applied it to our
most serious problems of educational choice.

Decision Analysis. For easy understanding, the science of decision making
is often expressed in the notation of decision analysis. and the notation is that of
an upside-down tree, as shown in Fig. 2.2. The best-known writer in this field is
undoubtedly Howard Raiffa (1968), whose approach can be appreciated without
extensive mathematics, and can be applied directly in practical situations.
In Fig. 2.2, let us suppose that there is a career choice at stake, such as
whether to pursue a premedical career or some other. In this drastically simplified representation, as in many more complex ones, there are just four aspects
of choice:
I. Decisions to be made (in squares).
2. Probabilities to be estimated (in circles).
3. Values of the outcomes (numbers at dots).
4. Costs of the choices (small tollgates) .

Let us assume that the values of the outcomes are estimated in the same units as
the costs at the tollgate. Then such a tree may be automatically solved by
applying recursively two rules, beginning at the bottom of the tree and working
up:

1. Probability nodes are averaged. by mUltiplying each value by its associated probability, summing across the branches, and carrying the weighted mean
up to the node.
2. Decision nodes are maximized. by selecting that branch that carries the
highest net value. (Costs are subtracted from the value of the relevant branch.)
Tests for Individual Decisions. Decision analysis, then, like most methods
used in operations research, suggests our optimal choice, under the assumption
of the correctness of our data.
But where do we obtain the number themselves? They are based on some sort
of data, either objective or subjective. And the role of tests in forecasting should
be closely tied to the probabilities shown. The probabilities of various outcomes,
once a decision is taken, must depend on all appropriate information about these
outcomes: the experiences of others and the chooser's own abilities, past
achievements, economic needs, and the like . For example, suppose that the
choice of Plan B is for premedical training, where the payoff ($100 ,000 a year?)
is high but where the general probability of success is only 1 in 5. In the
individual case, this probability should be adjusted to the person concerned.
Once again, test scores should play an important role in such adjustment , consid-
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FIG. 2.2 . A decision tree. A decision is reached by tracing out the branches as
far as possible , assigning values to each terminal node, and probabilities to each
branch from a P node. P nodes are then solved (working from the bottom up), by
averaging out the branches. And D nodes are solved by fo lding back all but the
most valuable branch as evaluated below each D. For vocations, the probability
values are determined by knowledge of both the world and self, as are also the
terminal values. Techn ical procedures can be appl ied to aid all such determinations. (Source: Page, 1974b, p. 71. Reprinted with permission .)

ered together with the background information about others who have gone
before.
Consider, then, what great damage is done to decision making, if tests are
discredited and not used or if they are eliminated from the tools of decision
makers by court order or administrative uncertainty . It is not only the testers who
have much at stake in such mistaken elimination of tests; the biggest losers are
the students and those who would guide and select them.
From even such a simple model, an immediate realization is that such decision trees become complex, requiring computer assistance in their solution-just
as life decisions are indeed complex, yet made quite haphazardly today, without
mathematical help. We sti ll await truly competent, computerized advisory systems for such choices, though we have been aware of the need for some years
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(Page, 1974b), and some working research models were established in the past
(Katz, 1966).

Tests for Program Decisions. Let us look at Fig. 2.2 from another viewpoint, as though we were administrators and the decision were between two
programs, here labeled A and B. Suppose Program B seems to produce higher
average values, where these are measured in terms of test scores, but our data are
from a national study, where there is confounding of tests with school practices
and with the SES variables of the communities. What we face , again, is that
decision sciences must depend not on naive correlational data but on production
functions of the treatment variables. If this seems an obvious point, then it has
been seriously neglected in the social planning of the past several decades, and
its neglect has led us to one disillusionment after another in the world of educational research and development (cf. Page, 1972a).
Scores as Production Functions. In our desire to use tests in planning, we
are often blocked when we must choose among educational programs. Choosing
a criterion test then becomes troubled. Suppose one program relies more on a
textbook and the other more on films. Then it will be very difficult to construct a
test that will not be biased toward one outcome or the other. Quite understandably, in such a situation, we often wisely choose tests that are not so close to the
programs. We may, rather, choose a selection of standardized tests of global
ability or achievement: in English, for example , or in math , social studies , or
natural sciences . But wait, these are the very tests we found to be heavi ly loaded
on the same g factor (general abi lity). Even more disturbingly, they are loaded on
the same G factor (general genetic ability). And when we employ pre- post
testing with such measures, the change scores have well-known problems. Are
we really expected to detect the effects of programs through such measures of
general (and even genetic) ability?
Yes, in general we must, for there seem to be few defensible alternatives. We
have mentioned the experimental bias of tests designed explicitly for the comparisons, and these (even where avai lable) have many problems beyond such
built-in program biases. Tests that are called "criterion referenced" frequently
exhibit these problems . We have long seen much literature for and against such
criterion referencing, and some excellent consideration and debate have occurred
(for example, by Julian Stan ley, Robert Ebel, Roger Lennon, and Frank
Womer) . For an extended period Dr. Womer directed the massive National
Assessment of Educational Progress, which was dedicated, at least originally , to
the criterion-referencing philosophy (also see Page, 1982 , on this philosophy).
For research questions about programs, such issues have a special bite.
Special Versus General Tests of Achievement. Let us briefly summarize our
dilemma: On one hand, it is fairly easy to write tests that measure some very
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limited body of knowledge (e.g. , the new vocabulary taught in a spec ific lesson) .
Here indeed we can show marked change from before an instruction to after. On
the other hand , a small handful of words will have practically no visible effect on
one's ability to read general matter- and this is the goal we really cherish for
major decisions. If we test only the explicit program content , we may be ac ting
out something like the " drunkard' s search ," which the philosopher Abraham
Kaplan used to tell us about at UC LA . The drunkard was feeling around under a
lamppost and was asked what he was looking for . " I dropped my key ." Where
did you drop it? " Over there. " But if you dropped it over there, why are you
looking for it over here, under the lamppost? " This is where the light is."
We can , after all , develop a test for the lesson just past , which may show us
how we improved . That is where the light is. But the most important outcomes of
education often seem like the lost key, beyond our reach , over there in the dark.
Is there a way out of this problem? Yes, if we have sufficient numbers and
sufficient random ass ignment and acc urate enough predictive control variables,
then our standard errors of the means will be small enough to permit comparisons
that are meaningful for such standard testing programs. Such conditions, however , hold in probably less than I % of the evaluation situations that face the
psychometric researcher .

Showing Environmental Effect. T he problem is not hopeless . If we have,
indeed , important variables, sufficient cases, and solid mode ls, we may be able
to show these important environmental influences in a helpful light. Let us
consider two findings from recent research on the applied issue o f private and
public schooling.
Our first case illustrates the danger o f fa iling to provide for large individual
differences (in g or in G) . Coleman , Hoffer , and Kilgore (1981) had cl aimed
very prominently that , even after' ' controlling" for effects of family, they found
a striking superiority of the private schools in the United States in the educational
achievement of the huge sample from High School and Beyond . In a reanalysis
of the data, however , this time including six brief subtests of mental ability
(mostly nonverbal and relatively school-free) , we found that any residual effect
of private school was less than 0 .5% of the variance in student achievement
(Page, 198 1; Page & Keith , 198 1) . Thus a claimed environmental effec t largely
disappeared when student input was weighed into the test. This is, of course , a
common enough result when such variables are included- which has apparently
led some to wish to avoid measuring intelligence in such research.
The second findings, from the same debate, had a more optimi stic o utcome ,
as shown in Fig . 2 .3 . In Fig. 2 .3, we observe some major student vari ables, such
as famil y background , race , and general ability , which are understandably loaded with parental influences , both genetic and environmental, and largely beyond
the control of the school system. But here we al so introduced the amount of
homework the student did , as a causal variable for the general achievement of
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FIG . 2.3. Explaining student ach ievemen t of students in private and public hi gh
schoo ls. After allowing for background variables, homework still explain s 3% of
test ach ievement. (Source: Page & Keith , 1981. Reprinted with permission.)

reading and math. Clearly, from the paths shown , our major background variables were fundamental in explaining test achievement; and the special control of
"general ability" (a factor score made from two short vocabulary tests and four
nonverbal tests) was the most influential of all. Yet the homework does shine
through, explaining 3% of the variance in achievement even after controlling for
background variables. The eternal verities of educational psychology sti ll stand:
After ability , time spent on task does make the most difference, and our standard
tests, even loaded as they are with heritability, can show that such time matters.
Indeed, in this case of school comparison, homework also helps explain about
half of the tiny effect of private schools.
Tim Keith and I believe that homework, then , is a major variable that all
schools should emphasize, one that could truly improve performance. Keith's
(1982) separate article shows this homework effect even more clearly for student
grades: There is, in fact , a possible compensation for low ability shown in this
study of grades, with the low-ability hard worker actually catching up with the
high-ability nonworker in such school performance. Keith's remarkable graph is
shown in Fig . 2.4.
But another problem of practical decision making is illustrated in this homework question. I have talked about these results with various groups of policy
people: school boards , legislators, practicing administrators, equal opportunity
officials, teachers, and even governors active in education. The idea of increasing homework seems to have no lobbies ! To the contrary, there is often an
embarrassed si lence (and the facts are indeed embarrassing, with the average
senior doing less than 4 hours of homework each week, in all classes combined).
Some educators have even denigrated the homework question altogether, speaking of "meaningless drill" and the like. Clearly, far more than our psychometric
research enters into educational policy! But this case does illustrate how test
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information may improve our knowledge of bas ic issues, and our understanding,
if not always our application, of practical issues .

Heritability and Program Research. Our general neglect of heritability has
led to research handicaps that may unfortunately hinder our understanding of
some policy issues . In order to guide curricular change, we should know which
variables are relatively more influenced by fami ly variables and which more
influenced by schools. But our usual research strategies, with no kinship controls, do not often permit thi s distinction. Given large samples of twins and
siblings, however, and item information across achievement tests, we could do
heritability analysis on each item. Or, if zygosity were not known for the twin
pairs, we could analyze which items were more influenced by home or school ,
and various analyses of these results could in turn illuminate areas for greater
curricular attention in those school s showing such deficits.
Still another application of such techniques could be in matters of national
assessment, where we seek to track the national performance of student generations and to study the changes from one generation to another. For example,
there remain large questions about the causes of the decline of standardized test
scores over the past 15 years or so. One real possibility-that declines were
caused by shifting ability levels of parents- was never really explored . Yet item
analysis of the SAT scores, using the huge available samples of twins, might cast
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some light on the question, through the following reasoning : Reused items may
be measured at two points in time and their gain or loss reported. The twin
correlations of such reused items may be also discovered. Then if the more
family-influenced items are those in which there is greatest decline, the inference
would be that the decline was more likely caused within the home than within the
school; and the conclusions wou ld be quite different from those in the contrary
case. Conceivably, this exploration would not be very productive (we would
soon find out), but it would open a major line of investigation. And it was a
thesis that would be very easy and inexpensive to explore. A major cluster of
hypotheses remained unstudied . Once again, our psychometric understandings
are frustrated by our current political and ideological commitments. And we have
failed to make adequate use of the psychometric information available to us in
our search for improved social strategies.

Decision Making and Ratio Scales. One apparent problem of test scores for
decision making is the following: Most scientific strategies for optimizing decisions require that benefits be measured on some absolute scale of values. In
many decision techniques (such as certain kinds of dynamic programming), one
develops a ratio of costs and benefits for each alternative choice , a ratio that
makes no sense unless both costs and benefits have some recognized zero points.
Even in simple decision trees like that in Fig. 2.2, where costs are used there
must be some way of equating costs and benefits; they must be translated to the
same scale. But in mental measurement, we take most of our test scores to be
interval scaled, not ratio scaled. How may this difficulty be overcome, so that the
most important outcomes of education may be appropriately studied?
This question has been considered elsewhere, but some general answers may
be suggested here. Any time we consider change in scores then we have , indeed,
a ratio scale, for no change will be zero; two points will be twice the value of one
point, etc. Now, as we know, change scores have their own problems, because
the error variances are additive, whereas the subtraction of one score from the
other eliminates from the result most of the variance in the true scores. But if we
use group change scores, as we often will in program decisions, then indeed the
errors of measurement are made very small as the number of observations grows
large; and our analysis may proceed.
Often, of course, we will not have repeated measures on the same group but
will have some other groups that may be regarded as controls for comparison
purposes in our multivariate studies. Here, again, a zero point may be established
as the mean made by the relatively "untreated" control, and a production function may be estimated as a relation between possible alternatives and the growth
in such means. This should not give the impression that all such questions of zero
points are easily resolved but that they can become tractable for many practical
purposes in scientific decision making. And we are currently taking little advantage of such strategies.

2.

STRUGGLES AND POSS IBILITIES

29

TEST SCORES AND DEEPER VALUES
Test scores, we have assumed , measure those outcomes for which we most
depend on our schools. The scores, then , stand for social values that we highly
esteem. Yet strangely little attention has been given to the placing of these test
values in some higher framework .
Suppose we ask the simplest curricular question: For example, should we
double the time for mathematics in a certain grade, at the expense of some other
course of study, such as history? How could we obtain evidence to help guide us
in this decision? It is striking that, after 70 years of using test scores and a
century of behavioral science, we still have no commonly accepted way of
combining such test scores or of trading them off against each other.

The Bentee. A decade ago, some of us studied this question , with the
concern of being able to use test scores as production functions (Page, I 972d,
1973, 1974a, 1976, 1980; Page & Breen, 1974a, 1974b). In this work , we felt it
necessary to invent a unit of measurement of educational benefit, called the
bentee, for benefit T-score. An illustration of the bentee is shown in Fig . 2.5.
In this figure, we note that the bentee represents the highest educational value,
and the branches beneath it stand for seven major branches of educational gain,
ranging from the verbal, quantitative, social sciences, and natural sciences
through esthetic learning, matters of the body (such as sports, health) to the
"personality" (which may include citizenship and moral and spiritual learning
where these are deemed appropriate). Each of these major branches may be itself
divided into subdivisions. In the present figure, only one, verbal, has been
divided into seven exhaustive areas. And one of these in turn, literature, has
been divided. And the tree branches down through poetic analysis and poetic
meter, to iambic pentameter, the great verse metric that has been the medium of
Shakespeare and of many of our greatest English poets. Recognition of iambic
pentameter, then, may be an explicit goal of instruction for good English students; it would be a suitable topic for a test item or for an operational objective in
instruction . In these steps, we observe that the tree reaches from the highest
philosophical and social values , through only a few steps, to the lowliest and
most concrete behavioral objective. Surprisingly, climbing down this tree , the
educational philosopher may actually be able to converse (chatter?) with the
educational psychologist, who may be occupied with behavior modification
techniques .
But how is the actual "evaluation" carried on? Having investigated two
methods, we believe that a "token" method may be suitable for most curricular
purposes: In this method, appropriate judges , acting individually, apportion 100
tokens (such as poker chips) among the half-dozen divisions at each branch. The
method may be applied recursively , at any level of the tree, and by judges chosen
as appropriate to that level. At the top, it might be educational leaders or simply
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FIG . 2.5. The recursive nature of the bentee method. As analys is moves from
the general to the spec ific, a shift is made from soc ietal to expert opinion and from
va lue space to test space. (So urce : E. B. Page, 1974 . Reprinted with permi ssion.)

in fo rmed citizens. At the lower levels, it might be subject matter specialists or
future employers (in training situations). These trees may be adapted for any new
program of study with its own nodes and branches.
Such a tree has a fairly clear relation to the use of test scores in decision
making. Where we have test scores for the various branches (such as English,
math , social studies, natural sciences), we may apportion our tokens according to
our beliefs in the relative benefits of these accomplishments. And our weightings
may vary with the individual concerned (the general student may have a different
weighting vector fro m the premed) or with the program under study . But once
such judgments are established , then we may proceed to evaluate the educational
accomplishment of individuals, of groups, and of programs. By adopting
changes in such bentees as our objectives, we may plot our production functions
as a relation between decision alternatives and the values that we seek to optimize . Given such methods, we may employ much more frequently the welldeveloped techniques of the dec ision sciences in our own studies of policy. (The
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reader is directed to related literature: For a technical approach different from the
bentee, see Dalkey, 1969 . For a deeper understanding of means-end analysis, see
Churchman, 1961. For a classic treatment of personnel decisions and test scores ,
see Cronbach & Gieser, 1965; and for the most advanced general treatment of
multiple objectives, see Keeney & Raiffa, 1976.)

PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS AND CAUSAL RESEARCH
We have already noted that "production functions" must involve more than
incidental relationships between variables. When we seek to "optimize" some
benefits from our decisions, we must depend on the assumption of a causal
relation between the decision alternatives and the desired benefit. For example,
suppose we note, as many researchers have, a recurring agreement between child
intelligence and family income. If we believe that this relation is causal, then we
naturally predict that when we change fami ly income, we will correspondingly
change child intelligence, at least to some limited degree. Programs to eliminate
poverty, therefore, according to this reasoning, should have a strong influence on
reducing school fai lure .
Or if we believe that such intelligence is a causal outcome of time spent with
the child by a well-intentioned adult , then we will predict that programs such as
Head Start will have a clearly beneficial effect on future performance of participating children. Many programs of recent decades have, in fact , been constructed on the assumption that observed correlations of this sort represented
strong causal relations . The disappointment about such programs results from the
ambiguous and debatable outcomes actually observed. (For a sharp disappointment in a major experiment, see Page, 1972a.) We do not need to resolve these
issues themselves to understand the need for some improved methods of policy
study. The most important improvement seems to be this: We must routinely
seek out data that will permit us to estab lish causal models explaining the
maximum amount of variance possible of those variables that we wish to optimize. This means, in the first place, that we indeed have such models and , in the
second, that we systematicall y collect the information that will maximize our
knowledge . The first requirement implies that we must turn to path analysis to
make explicit our causal models. Figure 2.3 shows such a model for exactly such
a purpose, here seeking a causal influence of homework time on test achievement. The second requirement implies that we should emphasize the use of
comprehensive data sets, rich with the correlates, whether from school, society ,
or fami ly , that most aid in causal explanation of our outcomes of interest. In Fig.
2.3, then, we truly wish to know the effect of homework time on achievement;
but we do not wish to be deceived by the correlates of race, SES, or other school
variables in estab lishing our "production function ." But if we did not collect
these background characteristics (including intelligence) or if we did not com-
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bine them properly into our causal model, we would be utterly deceived about
the effect of homework (just as Coleman, as mentioned earlier, was deceived in
his claimed effect of private schools).

Path Analysis. As a testing profession, then, interested in policy decisions,
we must turn to the rich discipline that is now the center for policy research in
most social sciences. This is the field of path analysis, introduced by Sewall
Wright (1921) some 6 decades ago. In its wandering route, it has come from
genetics, to economics, to sociology, to education and psychology and is now
found at the heart of many of the research journals in these fields. The number of
textbooks about path analysis has rapidly increased in recent years, and these
have improved in complexity and quality (Aigner & Goldberger, 1977; Blalock,
1971; Duncan, 1975; Heise, 1975; Kenny, 1979; Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973,
ch . 11; Li, 1975; Pedhazur, 1982, chs. 15-16; Taubman, 1977).
There is excellent research discipline in using these models. Because they are
explicitly causal, their use forces us to specify our hypotheses about the presence
and direction of causal influences and strongly encourages us to employ in our
models whatever variables we have available that may illuminate our interests.
Drawing and publishing such a model, moreover, forces us to put "up front" our
assumptions about these influences. If we have left out measures of intelligence ,
say, or family influence, then this will be apparent in our model. Or if we have
placed variables in the wrong order, thus distorting the influences, this too will
be apparent to our readers, whether they are allies or critics. These considerations, clearly, have huge meanings for debates about policy decisions. Indeed,
without such considerations of background influences, it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to plot out any ratios for costs versus anticipated benefits.
Comprehensive Data Sets. The second major requirement for such causal
reasoning is the availability and use of large data sets containing the information
necessary for causal inference and estimation. High School and Beyond is probably the most pertinent and available data set for many current concerns. It will be
still more valuable as the follow-ups are completed and distributed in 1983 and
beyond (current tapes are available through the National Center for Education
Statistics , U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C.) . A splendid data
set is also available in the predecessor to HSB, the National Longitudinal Study
of 1972, with its four follow-ups (also available from the NCES in Washington).
Still another valuable set of tapes may be obtained from the U.S. Department of
Labor, dealing more with work and later life and less with the high school years.
But each of these data sets lacks something of great importance in family background and many other matters that might be of large interest for many particular
policy questions .
Still, such data sets are much more powerful than many realize , even when
they appear to lack certain variables of prime concern . Advanced path techniques
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involving unmeasured variables or latent variables can often generate new factors much closer to the variables of real concern. For instance, we generated a
relatively school-free "mental ability" from factor analyzing a set of short
mental tests (Page & Keith, 1981) . Others have similarly constructed factors of
"self-concept" from a collection of items about attitude. HSB already supplies
an excellent SES scale from a weighted sum of many relevant questions about
education, occupation, home, and other factors. In general, then , a rich data set
can be much more than the simple sum of its parts.

CONCLUSIONS
From this analysis, there are some strong inferences to draw about the use of tests
in decision making, and we briefly summarize them here:
1. Test professionals and test users should stop being placed on the defensive by ill-informed and polemical critics. We should reassert, firmly and publicly , the many virtues of testing and the superiority of making decisions using
tests, compared with those made without tests.
2 . We should insist that psychometricians and others depending on tests be
heard in the major media when tests are discussed.
3. We shou ld stop being apologetic about the reality that tests do, in part,
show genetic influences and other family influences as well as social environmental influences. These are in fact part of their purpose.
4. We should cite frequently the research on the alleged biases of the most
widely used standardized tests of abi lity and achievement. In general, the conclusions are similar to those of the blue-ribbon National Academy of Sciences panel :
When properly used, tests are not biased against English-speaking U.S. minority
groups.
5. The measurement of intelligence is one of the greatest achievements in all
behavior science. The attempts to eliminate it from consideration at many decision points (such as selection for certain programs, schools, colleges, and professions) are not in the best interests of education nor of society as a whole.
6. When using tests in research on achievement, we should often lean
toward the avai lable standardized instruments, especially when these may be
treated securely.
7 . In such research situations, we should commonly control for the entering
ability of the students. It is often fallacious to make program selection without
such controls and may lead us to wasteful and disillusioning programs.
8. To assist in making decisions, test researchers should become more familiar with methods from the decision sciences, which permit technical analysis
of projected costs and benefits.
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9. To make use of such decision models, test researchers should translate
scores, where necessary, into useful values to serve as production functions.
10. But to use such production functions, we must look closely at the underlying causal relations of the variables (such as achievement) that we wish to
optimize. We should design these relations into explicitly causal models in path
analysis.
11. If researchers look only at the variables of narrow interest, they will often
be deceived by what Simon called "spurious correlation." Rather, the explanatory variables must be expanded to control, as much as possible, for background
correlates of both programs and outcomes.
12. Many of such correlates will be found strongly active in family influences . To study such family influences, wherever possible researchers should
look to twin pairs and other sibling and kinship relations, together with their
degree of kinship (e.g., if known, whether twins are identical or fraternal).
13. It is important that government agencies, large testing corporations, and
other collectors of data recognize the explanatory power of such family information and collect such variables into data sets wherever feasible.
14. And it is, finally, important that data sets be made inexpensively available to researchers , so that the causal study of human achievement may proceed
in as open and active and public an environment as we can create .
Now it should be evident why this chapter is called Struggles and Possibilities. Testing is struggling under attacks by many enemies, operating from
many motives and conceptions , often incorrect. And testing is also under constant criticism from its friends. It is friendly criticism, of course, that most
characterizes the scientific enterprise and the tradition of Oscar Buros, as editor
and model for this Institute that we celebrate in this volume. It is this ferment of
friendly and informed criticism that has fostered the splendid growth of our field
in its theoretical structure and in the construction and use of tests. These too are
struggles, and they are essential to the continuing evolution of testing. Surely,
the Buros Institute will continue this tradition of sharp and searching criticism by
its most knowledgeable friends.
We must call upon ourselves, as well, to defend our field firmly against the
defamations and uninformed assaults by its enemies. If we are faithful to the
scientific tradition of open scientific debate and self-criticism, then testing will
continue to grow and flourish, just as it has during the Buros' shared lifetime of
work . But let us , and the Institute, firmly and courageously take sides.
Our field, after all, is probably the soundest structurally of any in the social
and behavioral sciences . It is probably the most useful for decision making, for
individuals and for social programs. For its past accomplishments, it probably
has the smallest amount of apology to make- though it will surely be transformed in each succeeding generation as more is learned. Let us celebrate the
field as we celebrate the Buros Institute. Perhaps the Institute might prominently
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display on its wall those famou s lines from Shakespeare, now as applicable to
our discipline as to ourselves as individuals:
This above all: To thine own self be true,
And it must follow , as the night the day ,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.

REFERENCES
Aigner, D. J. , & Goldberger , A. S. (Eds .). Latent variables in socioeconomic models. Amsterdam:
North-Holland , 1977 .
Anderson, G. E . , Jr. Operations research: A miss ing link . Educational Researcher, March 1970 ,
21, 1- 3.
Banghart , F. Educational systems analysis. Toronto: Coll ier-Macmi llan, 1969.
Behrman, J. R ., Hrubec, Z., Taubman, P., & Wales, T . J . Socioeconomic success: A study of the
effects of genetic endowments, fa mily environment, and schooling. Amsterdam: North-Holland ,
1980.
Bereiter , C. Genetics and educabi lity: Educational implications of the Jensen debate. [n J . Hellmuth
(Ed.) , Disadvantaged child (Vol. 3). New York: Brunner-Mazel, 1970.
Bersoff, D. N. Testi ng and the law. American Psychologist, 198 1,36( 10),1047 - 1056 .
Blalock , H. M ., Jr. (Ed.). Causal models in the social sciences . Chicago: Ald ine, 197 1.
Cancro, R. (Ed.). Intelligence: Genetic and environmental influences. New York : Gru ne & Stratton ,
197 1.
Carroll , J . B ., & Horn , J . L. On the scientific basis of ability testing. American Psychologist, 198 1,
36(10) , 101 2- 1020 .
Churchman, C. W. Prediction and optimal decisions: Philosophical issues of a science of values.
Englewood C li ffs, N.J.: Prent ice-Hall , 196 1.
Churchman , C. W., Ackoff, R. L. , & Arnoff, S. L. Introduction to operations research. New York:
Wiley, 1957.
Cole , N. S. Bias in testing. American Psychologist, 198 1,36(10) , 1067 - 1077.
Co leman, J ., Hoffer, T., & Kilgore, S. Public and private schools. A report to the National Center
for Education Statistics by the Nati onal Opinion Research Center. University of Chicago, March
198 1.
Cronbach, L. J ., & Gieser , G. Psychological tests and personnel decisions (2nd ed.) . Urbana:
Uni versity of Illinois Press, 1965 .
Dalkey, N. Ana lyses from a group opinion study . Futures, December 1969, I, 54 1- 55 1.
Duncan, O . D. Introduction to structural eqllation models. New York: Academic , 1975.
Eaves, L. J ., Last, K., Martin , N . G., & Jinks, J . L. A progressive approach to non-additivity and
genotype-environmental covariance in the analysis of human differences. British Journal of
Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 1977 , 3D, 1- 42.
Edwards, W. , Guttentag, M. , & Snapper, K . A dec ision-theoretic approach to evaluation research.
[n E. L. Struening, & M . Guttentag (Eds.), Handbook of evaluation research (Vol. I). Beverly
Hill s, Calif.: SAGE, 1975. Ch. 8, pp . 139- 182.
Falconer, D. S . Introduction to quantitative genetics. New York : Ronald Press , 1960 .
Fuller, J . L., & Thompson, W. R . Foundations of behavior genetics. SI. Lou is , Mo .: Mosby, 1978.
Gou ld , S. J. Th e mismeasure of man . New York: Norton, 198 1.
Hamburg, M . Statistical analysis for decision making. New York : Harcourt , Brace & World , 1970.
Hebert , J. P . Race et intelligence. Paris: Copernic, 1977.
He ise, D . R. Causal analysis. New York: Wiley, 1975.

36

PAGE

Herrnste in , R. J . IQ in the meritocracy. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973.
Herrnstein, R. 1. IQ test ing and the med ia . Atlantic, August 1982,68- 74.
Hill ier, F. S., & Lieberman, G. J. In troduction 10 operations research (2nd ed.). San Fra ncisco:
Ho lden-Day, 1974.
Jensen, A. R. Bias in mental testing. New York: Mac millan-Free Press, 1980.
Jensen, A. R. Straight talk about mental tests. New York: Macm illan- Free Press , 198 1.
Johnstone, J. N. Mathematical models developed for use in educational planni ng : A rev iew. Review
of Educational Research, 1974,44(2), 177- 20 1.
Kam in, L. The science and politics of l Q . New York: W iley, 1973.
Katz, M . R . A model of guidance for career decis ion-making. Voca tional GlI idance Quarterly,
September 1966, 2- 10 .
Kaufman, R. Educational system plann ing. Englewood C liffs, N.J.: Prent ice-Ha ll , 1972.
Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. Decisions with multiple obj ectives : Preferences and value tradeo.lfs.
New York: Wiley, 1976.
Keith, T. Z . T ime spent on homework and high school grades: A large-sample pat h analys is.
Journal of Educational Psychology, 1982,74,248- 253.
Kenny, D. A. Correlation and causality. New York: Wil ey- Inte rsc ience, 1979.
Kerlinger, F. N ., & Pedhazur, E. J . Multiple regression in behavioral research. New York: Holt,
Ri nehart & Wi nston, 1973 .
Layzer, D. Heri tab ility analyses of IQ scores: Sc ience or numero logy? Science, 1974, 183,
1259- 1266.
Levin, H. M . Cost-effect iveness analys is in evaluation research. In M. Guttentag & E. L. Struening (Eds.), Handbook of evaluation research (Vo l. 2). Beverly Hill s, Ca lif.: SAGE, 1975. Ch.
5 , pp. 89- 122.
Li, C. C. Path analysis: A primer. Pac ific Grove, Ca li f.: Boxwood, 1975.
Li nn , R. L. Adm iss ions testing on trial. American Psychologist , 1982,34(3), 279- 29 1.
Loehlin , J . c., Lindzey, G., & Spuhler , J . N. Race differences in intelligence. San Franc isco:
Freeman, 1975.
Loehlin , J . C . , & Nichols, R. C. Heredity, environment, and personality: A study of 850 sets of
twins. Austin : University of Texas Press , 1976.
Marti n, N . G. The inheritance of scholastic abil it ies in a sample of twi ns: II . Genetical analys is of
exam ination results. Annals of Huma n Genetics, London , 1975, 39, 2 19- 229.
McNamara , J. F. Mathemat ica l programming models in educat iona l plann ing. Review of Educational Research, 197 1,4 1(5),4 19- 446.
Mercer, 1. R. Labelling the mentally retarded. Berkeley : Un ivers ity of Cali forn ia Press, 1977.
Nov ick, M. R., & Jackson, P. H. Statistical methods for educational and psychological research.
New York: McGraw-Hi ll , 1974.
Page, E. B. How we all fai led in performance contracti ng. Educational Psychologist, 1972, 9 ,
40- 42. (a)
Page, E. B. Miracle in Milwaukee: Raising the I.Q. Educational Researcher, 1972 , I( 10),8 - 15. (b)
Page, E. B. Resolution on scientific freedom and hered ity. American Psychologist, 1972, 27(7),
660- 66 1. (c)
Page, E. B. Seek ing a measure of general educat ional advance ment : The bentee. Jou rnal of
Educational Measurement , 1972,9( 1) , 33- 43. (d)
Page, E. B. Effects of higher education: Outcomes, values, or benefits. In L. C. Solmon & P.
Taubman (Eds.), Does college matter? Some evidence on the impacts of higher education . New
York: Academ ic, 1973. Pp. 159- 172.
Page , E. B. 'Top-down ' trees of educational va lues. Educational and Psychological Measurement,
1974,34(3), 573- 584. (a)

2.

STRUGGLES AND POSSIBILITIES

37

Page, E. B. Problems and perspectives in measuring vocational maturity . In D. E. Super (Ed.) ,
Measuring vocational maturityfor cOllllseling and evaluation. Washington , D. c.: Monograph of
the National Vocational Guidance Association, 1974. (b)
Page , E. B. Heritability of inte lligence: Methodological questions. Techni ca l co mment , Science, 13
June 1975, 188(4193), 11 26- 11 28 .
Page , E . B. The optimization of educational values in Navy curriculum design. Proceedin gs of the
American Statistical Association: Social Statistics, Part II : 1976, 655 - 659 .
Page , E. B. Should educational evaluation be more objective or more subj ective? More objective!
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 1978 , 1(1) , 5- 6
Page , E. B. Tests and decisions for the hand icapped: A guide to eva luation under the new laws.
Special issue: A monograph , Journal of Special Education , Winter 1980, 14(4) .
Page, E. B. The media, technical analysis, and the data feast: A response to Co leman. Educational
Researcher, 1981, 10(7),2 1- 23.
Page , E. B. Rethinking the principles of national assessment: Towards a more useful and higher
quality knowledg e base for education. Report commiss ioned by the National In stitute of Education . In ERIC, 1982.
Page, E. B. , & Breen , T. F. , III. Ed ucational values for measurement technology: Some theory and
data . In W . E. Coffman (Ed.), Frontiers in edu cational measurement and il1j'o rmation processing. Boston : Houghton-Mifflin , 1974 . C h. 3, pp . 13- 30. (a)
Page, E. B., & Breen, T. F. , III. Factor analysis of educat ional va lues across two methods of
judgment. Proceedings of the 15th 1nteramerican Congress of Psychology (Bogota, Colombia) ,
1974, pp . 106- 107. (b)
Page, E. B. , & Canfie ld , J . Design of Navy course structure through a dynam ic programming
algorithm. Report for the U.S. Navy Personnel R. & D. Center, San Diego , Calif. , June 1975.
Page, E. B. , & Grandon, G. M. Mass ive intervention and child intelli gence: The Mil waukee Project
in c ritical perspective . Joumal of Special Education , 1981 , 15(2) ,239- 256.
Page, E. B. , & Jarjoura , D. Seeking the cause of correlations among mental abilit ies: Large twin
analysis in a national testing program. Specia l issue on Inte lli gence , Joumal of Research and
Development in Education, 1979, 12(2), 108- 11 7.
Page , E. B. , Jarjoura , D. , & Konopka , C. C urricu lum des ign through operations research. American
Educational Research Joul'I/al, 1976, 13( I), 3 1- 49.
Page , E. B. , & Keith, T. Z. Effect of U.S. private sc hool s: A tec hni ca l ana lys is of two rece nt
c laims. Educational Researcher, August 198 1, 10(7) , 7- 17 .
Pedhazur, E. 1. Multiple regression in behavioral research: Explanation and prediction (2nd ed.) .
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Win ston , 1982.
Raiffa, H. Decision analysis: Introdu ctory lectures 011 choice under uncertainty. Boston: Addi sonWesley, 1968 .
Reschly , D. J . Psychological testing in educ ational class ification and place ment. American Psychologist, 198 1,36( 10), 1094- 1102.
Scarr-Sa lapatek, S. Race, soc ial class , and IQ . Science, 197 1, 174 , 1285 - 1295.
Schmidt , F. L., & Hunter, J . E. Employ ment testing: Old theories and new researc h findings.
American Psycholog ist, 1981, 36(10), 11 28- 11 37.
Stanley , 1. c., & Hopkins, K. D. Educational and psychologica l measurement and evaluation.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall , 1972.
Taubman , P. (Ed .) . Kinometrics: Determinants of socioeconomic success within and betweenfamilies. Amsterdam: North-Holl and , 1977.
Thompson, J . N., Jr. , & Thoday , J . M . (Eds .). Qualllitative genetic variation. New York: Academic, 1979.
Thorndike , E. L. The nature , purposes , and general methods of measurements of educational products. Th e 17th Yearbook of the Nat ional Society for the Study of Education , Part II . 19 18.

38

PAGE

Tillett, P. I. Optimization of secondary teacher assignments using operations research. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences (London), 1975 , 9, 101 - 104 .
Trueman , R. E . An introduction to quantitative methods for decision making. New York: Holt ,
Rinehart & Winston , 1974 .
VanDusse ldorp, R. A . , Richardson, D. W . , & Fo ley, W. J. Educational decision-making through
operations research . Boston: Allyn & Bacon , 1971.
Wagner, H. M. Principles of operations research: With applications 10 managerial decisions.
Engle wood Cli ffs, N.J .: Prent ice- Hall, 1969.
Winkler , R. L., & Hays , W. L. Statistics: Probability, inference, and decision (2nd ed.). New
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1975.
Wright, S. Correlation and causation. lournal of Agricultural Research, Inl, 20, 557- 585.

